The Wisconsin BadgerCare program, which became operational in July 1999, expanded public health insurance eligibility to both parents and children in families with incomes below 185 percent of the U.S poverty line (200 percent for those already enrolled). This eligibility expansion was part of a federal initiative known as the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). Wisconsin was one of only four states that initially expanded coverage to parents of eligible children. In this paper, we attempt to We apply multiple methods to address the policy evaluation question, including probit, random effects, and two difference-in-difference strategies, and compare the results across methods. All of our estimates indicate that BadgerCare substantially increased public health care coverage for mother-only families leaving welfare. Our best estimate is that BadgerCare increased the public health care coverage of all adult leavers by about 17-25 percentage points.
population and an incentive to employment in firms that may not offer health insurance. 4 As such it is one of the most extensive state reforms in response to SCHIP, and its eligibility criteria, financing, and benefit structure have been studied by several other states and considered at the federal level.
Because eligibility rules for Medicaid differ by age and pregnancy status in Wisconsin, and federal law requires enrollment in Medicaid where eligible, eligibility for BadgerCare is determined separately for each individual in a family unit. 5 Most low-income children under age 6 and pregnant women have continued to be covered by Medicaid, since the Medicaid and BadgerCare eligibility thresholds are nearly identical for these groups. The majority of BadgerCare enrollees have been adults with income above the Medicaid limit but below 185 percent of the poverty line. percent of the poverty line paid a monthly premium equal to about 3 percent of their income. 7 Despite this premium requirement for those at the higher end of the BadgerCare income distribution, BadgerCare has 4 Tommy Thompson, the governor of Wisconsin at the time, said repeatedly that BadgerCare was intended as a complement to W-2-as a source of health care support for W-2 participants as they moved off cash assistance and into work. On the State of Wisconsin web site, the program is described as follows: "BadgerCare seeks to eliminate barriers to successful employment by providing a transition for families from welfare to private insurance. BadgerCare is based on the premise that health care is essential for working families with children." http://www.dhfs.state.wi.us/badgercare/html/glance-1.htm 5 Since the federal government pays a higher proportion of SCHIP program costs than of Medicaid costs, those who are eligible for both Medicaid and SCHIP are required to enroll in Medicaid. The Medicaid eligibility threshold in Wisconsin is 185 percent of the poverty line for children below age 6 and for pregnant women, 100 percent of the poverty line for children aged 6-14, and averaged about 57 percent of the poverty line for children aged 15-19 and for nonpregnant adults when BadgerCare was established. 6 By August 2004 the BadgerCare caseload had grown to 100,949, two-thirds of whom were still adults. Probably owing in part to new requirements for more frequent documentation from employers that BadgerCare participants are ineligible for low-cost, employment-based health insurance, BadgerCare caseloads fell to 89,441 by July 2005, at which time adults were 68 percent of the caseload. 7 In July 2003 the premium was raised to 5 percent. If other family members do not elect BadgerCare coverage, pregnant women and children below age 6 receive Medicaid coverage up to 185 percent of the FPL without paying a premium. grown to become a major component of public health insurance coverage in Wisconsin. In July 1999, just before the introduction of BadgerCare, 218,000 people were enrolled in publicly subsidized family-based coverage 8 . By the end of 2001, 367,000 people were enrolled, and one-quarter of enrollees were covered by BadgerCare.
In this paper, we analyze the extent to which BadgerCare was successful in reducing the population of low-income single mothers without health care coverage among cohorts of low-income, single-mother families who received cash assistance under the Wisconsin AFDC and TANF programs in September 1995 September , 1997 September , and 1999 and subsequently left welfare. We have quarterly observations of the earnings and health insurance status of the entire population of families in these three cohorts, and measure quarters in terms of the time since leaving cash assistance.
In the absence of a random assignment framework, we require an estimation strategy that will enable us to effectively control for relevant economic and policy phenomena other than the program itself that may have affected the level of health insurance coverage for the three cohorts. To this end, we adopt several approaches to disentangling the effects of BadgerCare from other factors. First, we present probit and random effects estimates, both of which control for individual characteristics but with different assumptions about unobserved characteristics. Public health insurance coverage is the bivariate dependent variable in these estimates. Both of these models incorporate variables designed to control for economic conditions that are likely to affect health care coverage (e.g., county unemployment rate and the percentage of county employees working in larger firms more likely to offer health insurance). However, other relevant economic changes not reflected by these controls may influence the level of health insurance coverage for these populations. 8 Family-based programs require the presence of a minor child for eligibility and exclude people eligible because of participation in the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program.
To address this deficiency, we also present results of two difference-in-difference estimates that control for economic and attitudinal changes not captured in the probit and random effects estimates.
Time-related changes in the familiarity of single mothers with the welfare office where eligibility for public health insurance is established (or in their willingness to visit this office), preferences for work and welfare, economic factors not captured in the regressions, and program administration characteristics that affect likelihood of entry 10 are examples. One difference-in-difference estimate relies on the observation that two of the cohorts had similar patterns of program coverage during the early quarters after leaving welfare before BadgerCare was available for either cohort, and that these patterns diverged after one cohort gained access to BadgerCare. The second difference-in-difference estimate compares those continuously eligible for public coverage to those made newly eligible by the establishment of BadgerCare within each of two cohorts.
III. RELATED LITERATURE
Our estimates build on a number of prior studies that have attempted to assess the success of the federal SCHIP program in providing health insurance coverage to low-income populations, primarily low-income children. Several of the papers have sought to identify the role of state policy choices in the Medicaid and SCHIP programs on children's health coverage. 11 Both the proportion of eligible children who are enrolled in public health insurance programs (Medicaid and SCHIP) and the proportion of lowincome children eligible for coverage have been studied. Many of the studies rely on either the Current Population Survey or the Urban Institute's Survey of America's Families, of necessity assessing the effect of policies on the samples selected by the two surveys. Our study, in contrast, uses administrative data 10 Changes in the information available (e.g., through increased or decreased advertising of the public insurance program) and altered requirements for eligibility verification of income or private health insurance status are examples of such administrative developments.
11 For example, the U.S. General Accounting Office (2001) studied how enrollment policies influenced take-up in ten states. from one state, allowing for analysis of the effects of a policy change on entire populations of motherheaded families that left cash assistance at varying periods. Dubay and colleagues (2002) used data from the Urban Institute New Federalism project along with CPS data to analyze children's coverage (compared to parent's coverage), and report substantial positive effects from the introduction of SCHIP on children's coverage. They create an eligibility simulation model for children and conclude that eligibility thresholds are an important determinant of coverage.
More recently, LoSasso and Buchmueller (2004) studied this same question and the related issue of the crowd-out of private insurance, using CPS data for 1996-2001. They rely on differences in timing and the details of state expansions, disaggregating estimated effects on coverage and crowd-out by family income levels and other characteristics, and find that the introduction of SCHIP caused a small increase in parental public coverage, with about a quarter of this increase offset by a decline in private coverage. Kronebusch and Elbel (2004) include Medicaid as well as SCHIP, and focus on the effect of state programmatic decisions on the Medicaid and SCHIP coverage of children in families with incomes below 400 percent of the FPL, using CPS data for 2000. Employing logit models with the dependent variable specified as enrolled in Medicaid, SCHIP (one or both), or privately insured, they find that states administering SCHIP programs as Medicaid expansions are more successful in enrolling children than those with either separate SCHIP plans or combination programs. They also find several policy designs that are important to enrollment expansions, such as removing asset tests and implementing presumptive eligibility (which lead to increased enrollment) and longer waiting periods and premiums (which lead to reduced enrollment). They estimate that if all states adopted the policy options that facilitate program use, enrollment for children with family incomes less than 200 percent of the poverty line could be raised from the current rate of 42 percent to 58 percent. 12 Finally, Wolfe and Scrivner (2005) study the effect of SCHIP on low-income (below 300 percent of FPL) children's coverage, using two years of CPS data; they emphasize the roles of state policy design characteristics and state-specific private insurance markets. Their simulations suggest that a set of design elements in state SCHIP programs reduced uninsurance rates among children from 21 percent in states without these policies to 14 percent in states with the policies. Examples of these design elements are the use of telephone hotlines and presumptive eligibility, and no requirement that applicants be without coverage for several months before applying or that applicants meet with eligibility workers face-to-face.
There has been less study of the effect of the SCHIP program on the health care coverage of adults, which is the focus of this paper. Kronick and Gilmer (2002) employ both a logistic equation with state fixed effects and a pre-post descriptive analysis, together with CPS data from 1988 to 1999, and study the extent to which SCHIP programs in four states increased the coverage of adults with incomes above and below the federal poverty line (FPL). They find evidence of increased coverage for those with incomes below the FPL and no evidence of crowd-out. For those with incomes from 100-200 percent of the FPL, they find both an increase in coverage and the substitution of public for private coverage.
13 Ku and Broaddus (2000) conduct a largely descriptive study of adult coverage in three states; their finding of increased coverage lacks controls for other policy changes introduced at the same time, reducing the reliability of the study's conclusions. In an analysis employing a state fixed effects estimation approach and several years of CPS data, Busch and Duchovny (2002) study the impact of state expansions of Medicaid to 100 percent or more of the FPL and find both increased coverage of parents and positive health impacts. Aizer and Grogger (2004 ) also used CPS data (1996 -2001 to study the effect of Medicaid expansions within states on the coverage of parents with income below 200 percent of FPL (and parents likely to be newly eligible or near-eligible for public health insurance coverage); in essence, they conduct a difference-in-difference comparison of those newly eligible to those continuously eligible, and find a positive effect on the coverage of non-white, but not white, parents.
14 In this study, we extend the limited work on the effects of SCHIP-related policy expansions on the health coverage on low-income parents by focusing on the BadgerCare program in Wisconsin. We investigate the independent effect of the BadgerCare expansion of SCHIP to low-income parents on their overall health insurance coverage and on enrollment in public insurance. We also present estimates of the magnitude of effects. Unlike the prior studies, we employ multiple estimation approaches designed to assess the independent effect of the program. We also employ several years of quarterly data on the entire populations of three cohorts of families, rather than annual data or limited samples. The populations that we study are a central target population for the SCHIP policy innovation-low-income, mother-only families who were past recipients of cash public assistance.
IV. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
Using a coordinated set of administrative databases, we analyze the quarter-by-quarter effect of the BadgerCare program on the probability that low-income, single-mother families are covered by: 1) public health insurance, 2) any form of health insurance, and 3) no health insurance. We measure quarters in terms of time since leaving cash assistance, and study three cohorts of mother-only families who 14 A related set of studies of policy changes on coverage complements these more direct efforts. For example, Pavetti, Maloy, and Schott (2002) study the extent to which a set of "promising practices" of a set of local welfare offices (e.g., type and site of outreach, ease of application) in fifteen sites increased enrollment and retention in the Food Stamp and public health insurance programs. In a rather different approach, Dubay and Kenney (2004) simulate the potential effect of extending Medicaid and SCHIP coverage to parents, and find a large potential effect on low-income parents of such extensions-perhaps 70 percent of all uninsured parents would be covered if parental eligibility levels for parents and children were the same. Other papers have asked whether state provision of parental coverage by Medicaid increases the coverage of children. For example, Dubay and Kenney (2003) conduct a twostage study (across states and within one state) of this question; both stages of the study suggest a strong link between increases in parental coverage and that of their children. received cash assistance under the Wisconsin AFDC and TANF programs in September 1995 September , 1997 September , and 1999 and subsequently left welfare. Because we track these "leaver" families from two years before they left welfare through the end of 2001, we are able to use their quarterly labor market and welfare histories in analyzing the outcomes. In estimating the effect of BadgerCare on insurance coverage, we exploit the coverage patterns of these mothers from the period before BadgerCare to the period after BadgerCare was instituted.
15 Appendix 1 provides details of the data sets and the variables used.
The women in our data were those receiving assistance under the AFDC-Regular or W-2 programs in September of 1995, 1997, and 1999 , and listed as the "case head" (without the father of any of the children also listed). We select from these participants those "leavers" who exited cash assistance within three months after our initial observation date and remained off the welfare caseload for at least caseload to have greater barriers to independence (lower educational attainment, younger and more children, and the presence of someone in the household with a severe disability) than those receiving benefits in 1995. The statistics in Table 1 are generally consistent with this expectation: women in the 1997 and 1999 caseloads are younger, have less education and work experience, more children, and a higher probability of a child with significant disabilities (children on SSI) than those in the 1995 caseload.
Eligibility for and Enrollment in Public Health Insurance
Using these demographic and income data, we identify all families from among the population of leavers in each of the three cohorts that are eligible for BadgerCare/MA benefits, using an income-based algorithm that calculates MA eligibility for each household member based on the poverty-related criteria for eligibility.
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Figures 2a-2c show the quarterly trends in the percentages of women who are eligible for and who take-up public health insurance (MA and BadgerCare) from the date of exit from cash assistance for each of the three cohorts of women. The height of the bars indicates the proportion of women eligible for public health insurance; among those eligible, coverage could either be taken up or not.
As Figure 2a shows, nearly all 1995 welfare leavers were eligible for MA at the time that they left cash assistance; about 80 percent of them accepted MA benefits. Both MA eligibility and coverage fell after these women left welfare until the beginning of BadgerCare, when only 66 percent were eligible for MA and fewer than 20 percent were enrolled (implying a take-up rate of about 30 percent). After
BadgerCare is introduced in the third quarter of 1999, both eligibility and the enrollment rates substantially increase. From the quarter prior to BadgerCare to the quarter after, the percentage of these women eligible for public support rose from 63 percent to about 92 percent and, the proportion covered by public health insurance increased from about 18 percent in the quarter prior to the introduction of 16 Household earnings are calculated as the total earnings reported in the UI database, with deductions of $90/month for work expenses and $30/month plus 1/3 of the remaining earnings. A more detailed description of this calculation algorithm is available from the authors, upon request. For these two cohorts of leavers who did not initially have access to BadgerCare upon leaving cash assistance, the introduction of BadgerCare appears to have contributed to an increase in both the proportion eligible for public health insurance and the proportion enrolled. Both cohorts show a steady decline in public health insurance coverage from the time of exit to the introduction of BadgerCare, largely owing to the decline in MA coverage. However, when BadgerCare becomes available, the downward trends stop and enrollment in public health insurance increases.
The patterns for the 1999 cohort, for whom BadgerCare was an immediate option upon departure from cash assistance, are shown in Figure 2c . The eligibility rate remained above 90 percent for the entire period, and showed virtually no downward trend, suggesting that most of the women in this group of leavers had earnings insufficient to raise them above BadgerCare eligibility levels. By the last quarter of 2001, the take-up rate exceeds 70 percent, which is far higher than for the earlier cohorts; over onequarter of those eligible are enrolled in BadgerCare.
Uninsured or Covered by Public and Private Health Insurance
Because some leavers find jobs that provide employer-based insurance coverage or marry a spouse with family insurance coverage, BadgerCare and MA are not the only sources of health insurance.
We use information in our data to estimate both the proportion of these women with private insurance coverage among these cohorts of leavers (and hence the level of overall insurance coverage) and the proportion of these women who remained uninsured-uncovered by both public and private insurance. 17 Hence, there are four mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories of health insurance coverage: 1) not eligible for public or private health insurance, and uninsured, 2) eligible for public or private health insurance, but uninsured, 3) covered by private insurance, and 4) covered by public insurance.
In Figures 3a and 3b we show the composition of women in the 1995 and 1997 cohorts, by these categories. For both cohorts, the utilization of private insurance steadily increases as the take-up of public health insurance drops during the initial quarters after women left cash assistance, reflecting their greater participation in the labor market. On the eve of BadgerCare, about 76 percent of 1995 leavers were eligible for some kind of health insurance, 65 percent for public health insurance and 11 percent for private health insurance, and about 87 percent of 1997 leavers were eligible for some form of coverage, 81 percent from public health insurance and 6 percent from private coverage.
After the introduction of BadgerCare, the proportion of these low-income single mothers eligible for some form of health insurance expanded, to about 90 percent for the 1995 cohort and 92 percent for the 1997 cohort. For both cohorts, the proportion of women covered by public health insurance increased after BadgerCare, while the share holding private health insurance remained relatively constant. A larger 17 Our estimate of the number of women who are covered by private health insurance is based on the following assumptions and procedures. Wisconsin Unemployment Insurance files indicate whether a firm offers health insurance to its employees. Using the Unemployment Insurance records for each leaver, we estimate the number of leavers with their own employer-based insurance. We assume that leavers with all of the following characteristics have private health insurance: (1) they had worked for at least two consecutive quarters for the same firm, which offers health insurance to its employees, (2) they earn sufficient for us to deem them "full-time" workers, and (3) they are not enrolled in MA or BadgerCare. Employers generally do not offer health insurance to employees working less than 50 percent of full time, and some employers offer health insurance only to full-time workers. We assume that women who earn at least $2,343 in quarterly earnings-equal to 35 hours per week times the minimum wage of $5.15 per hour-are full-time workers. In addition, we restricted our assumption of private coverage to those who worked for the same firm offering health insurance for at least two quarters because employers commonly do not offer health insurance for new employees. Wisconsin law does not allow potential BadgerCare participants who have access to private insurance for which the employer pays at least 80 percent of the premium to participate in BadgerCare. 
ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF BADGERCARE ON PUBLIC HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE
In this section, we report four estimates of the effects of the BadgerCare program on the level of public health insurance coverage for our cohorts of low-income women: probit estimates, random effects estimates, and two difference-in-difference approaches to account for unobserved factors related to the 18 Over the entire period, but especially after BadgerCare was introduced, a far higher proportion of the 1995 cohort remained uninsured even though eligible for public coverage than was the case for the 1997 cohort. A possible explanation is that leavers in the 1995 cohort had been away from contact with the welfare system for a longer time than their counterparts in the 1997 cohort when BadgerCare was introduced, and hence less likely to be aware of their eligibility for BadgerCare.
19 As a test of sensitivity to our definition of private coverage, we used two alternative definitions: (1) working one quarter for a firm that offers coverage and earning at least $2,343 and a more stringent definition (2) that requires an individual to be in the third quarter of working for a firm that offers coverage and again earning at least $2,343. The overall pattern is quite robust to these alternative definitions of private coverage. 
Hence, the probability of having public health insurance is shown as:
Our probit specification of the effect of BadgerCare, 2 α , postulates that the probability that a woman will have public health coverage is related to a large number of independent variables that reflect factors potentially related to this outcome. The estimates, made separately for the 1995 and 1997 cohorts, are consistent and asymptotically normal without any further assumptions. The variance of these estimates is obtained taking into account repeated observations of the same person over time.
The individual characteristics include demographic characteristics such as race, education, age and number of children, and earnings and welfare history. The general time effect is reflected in the number of quarters since the woman exited cash assistance, and is introduced as a quadratic, in order to allow for differential influence of time since cash welfare receipt. These are complemented by locality characteristics including the proportion of female-headed families in the woman's neighborhood, the current unemployment rate of each county of residence, and the proportion of jobs in large firms in each county. Finally, a dummy variable for whether or not BadgerCare was available captures the independent effect of the program. The random effects model that we estimate is:
where is the cumulative density function of standard logistic. Given the large number of observations over which our model is fit, the maximum likelihood estimate of the random effects logit regression provides a consistent estimate of the effect of BadgerCare on health insurance coverage.
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We estimated this model as a logistic regression over both the 1995 and 1997 cohorts; the results are shown in Table 3 . The coefficient on the BadgerCare variable is positive and significant for both the 1995 and 1997 cohorts and of similar magnitude, again suggesting that the availability of BadgerCare is significantly associated with an increase in the probability of public health insurance coverage for this group of low-skilled single mothers, after controlling for both observed and unobserved potential factors likely to be associated with health insurance coverage.
Because both the probit and the random effects estimates are from a nonlinear model, it is difficult to perceive the quantitative importance of the availability of BadgerCare on the probability of public health insurance coverage. In Table 4 , we present the results of a simulation of this probable effect, holding other variables in the estimates at their actual values. Simulated effects are presented for the simple probit results without individual unobserved effects, and for the random effects estimates with individual unobserved effects that do not vary over time.
The first two columns of Table 4 indicate the effect of BadgerCare on public health insurance coverage from the probit model estimates shown in Table 2 . Holding all other variables at their actual levels, the probability of having public coverage with BadgerCare in place (compared to not having BadgerCare) is increased by six percentage points for the 1995 cohort (from .21 to .27) and eight percentage points (from .57 to .65) for the 1997 cohorts. The final two columns of Table 4 present analogous results from the random effects model shown in Table 3 . Again the estimated effect of BadgerCare for the 1995 cohort is six percentage points (from .21 to .27) while for the 1997 cohort, it is eight percentage points (from .57 to .65). These estimates consistently suggest that the introduction of the BadgerCare program raised the probability of having public health insurance coverage by 6 percentage points for the 1995 cohort and 8 percentage points for the 1997 cohort.
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Difference-in-Difference Estimations
Our first difference-in-difference estimate treats the introduction of BadgerCare as a quasiexperiment to which the 1997 leavers, but not the 1995 leavers, are exposed. It exploits the similar patterns of public health insurance coverage 23 in the first seven quarters after leaving welfare for both cohorts, when neither cohort experienced BadgerCare; Figure 4 shows these similar, pre-BadgerCare trajectories. 24 At the 8 th quarter after leaving, only the 1997 cohort experienced BadgerCare, and at this point its coverage levels begin to deviate from that of the 1995 cohort, unlike the similar patterns in the pre-BadgerCare period. Thus, we obtain our difference-in-difference estimate by comparing the coverage pattern in quarters 8-15 since leaving welfare for the 1997 cohort (during which time they experienced the BadgerCare program) with the coverage pattern in the analogous 8 quarters since leaving for the 1995 cohort (during which time the program did not exist). During quarters 8-15 since leaving, the 1997 cohort serves as the "treatment" group and the 1995 cohort is the "control" group. This estimate controls for several unobserved changes that occur over the relevant period of observation, such as the willingness to visit the welfare office to establish eligibility for public health insurance or preferences for work and welfare.
25 Table 5 shows the results of our difference-in-difference estimate of the effect of BadgerCare on public health care coverage using the comparison between the 1995 and 1997 cohorts. The coefficient on the BadgerCare variable in this "quasi-experiment" model indicates that the effect of BadgerCare is 23 percentage points. 26 In an alternate specification of this model, we included the quarters since exit as a set of dummy variables rather than as a quadratic. 27 This estimate suggests that the increase in coverage due to the introduction of BadgerCare is 25 percentage points. Both of these estimates then suggest a much greater increase in coverage due to the introduction of BadgerCare compared to the estimates based on the probit and random effects models.
A caveat of this first difference-in-difference approach is that two cohorts face different calendar periods, although the time since exit is equivalent. It is possible that the different environments may influence or bias our estimate of the effect of the introduction of BadgerCare. Thus, we use a "within cohort" difference-in-difference approach to control for unobserved, time-varying differences between the two cohorts not reflected in their differing use of Medicaid in their first 8 quarters after exit from cash assistance. This approach identifies those women who are newly eligible for public coverage due to the introduction of BadgerCare as the "treatment" group, whereas those who were continuously eligible for public coverage serve as a "control" group. The result is a within-cohort, with-without estimate of the effect of BadgerCare on public health insurance coverage, conducted separately for the 1995 and 1997 cohorts.
The second difference-in-difference estimate is also a "quasi-experimental "approach, but in this case based on a within-cohort comparison. In this estimate, we compare those continuously eligible for public coverage to those newly eligible for public coverage via the introduction of BadgerCare. This approach enables us to focus on the effect of BadgerCare on those most likely to be influenced by the implementation of the program-those newly eligible for public coverage via the introduction of this 26 An effect of this magnitude is hinted at in Figure 4 . By quarter 15 after leaving, the between cohort predicted difference is about 14 percentage points (about 36 percent less 22 percent), and the difference between the actual level of coverage for the 1997 cohort and the predicted level of coverage for the 1995 cohort (if they had the characteristics of the 1997 cohort) is about 21 percentage points (57 percent less 36 percent). 27 In this alternative specification of the general time effect, a series of dummy variables for time since exit are included so that equation (1) We make this difference-in-difference estimate separately for the 1995 and the 1997 cohorts and report the results in Table 6 . Again, public health insurance coverage is the dependent variable. Those who were continuously eligible for public coverage serve as the controls in this approach while those newly eligible are the "treated." 28 These results, which suggest that BadgerCare led to an increase in coverage of 21 percentage points for the 1995 cohort and 17 percentage points for the 1997 cohort, are consistent with the first difference-in-difference approach.
Taken together, the two difference-in-difference estimates suggest a larger effect of BadgerCare on the health insurance coverage of these low-income welfare leavers than do the probit and random effects estimates. We are generally more persuaded by the difference-in-difference estimations. The probit and random effect models do not take into account the probability that coverage would have decreased in the absence of the introduction of BadgerCare, as the earnings of leavers rose and as eligibility for Medicaid fell over time among those eligible. They also lack controls for unobserved characteristics that are likely to vary over time.
VI. CONCLUSION
The enactment of the BadgerCare program in Wisconsin provided a major expansion of health insurance availability, offering coverage to adults in low-income families with children, and increasing the income levels under which coverage is available. In this study, we examined the effects of BadgerCare on the health insurance coverage of low-income women who left cash assistance using several estimation approaches. Table 7 summarizes the results of our analyses. All of our estimates indicate that BadgerCare substantially increased public health care coverage for mother-only families leaving welfare. This conclusion seems robust using different estimation approaches. The probit and random effects approaches
show that BadgerCare increased coverage by 6-8 percentage points, and the difference-in-difference approaches suggest that BadgerCare increased public health insurance coverage by 17-25 percentage points. Because we have more confidence in the difference-in difference estimates, we believe the actual increase is closer to the top of the 6-25 percentage point range than to the bottom.
APPENDIX 1 Sample and Variable Definition
We use merged administrative data from the state of Wisconsin, including: 1) the Client Assistance for Reemployment and Economic Support (CARES) system, which includes information collected in administering AFDC, W-2, and related means-tested programs, 2) the Computer Reporting Network (CRN) system, the precursor of CARES, providing earlier AFDC administrative data useful for constructing an AFDC history for each case, and 3) the Unemployment Insurance (UI) system, which includes quarterly information on earnings and employers. We extracted data from the CARES database for all women receiving assistance under the AFDC-Regular or W-2 programs in September of 1995, 1997, and 1999 . Among them, those who did not live with the father of any of the children also listed on the case, who had minor children in the case, and who were at least 18 years old and no older than 65
were listed as the "case head." We selected from these participants those women who exited cash assistance within three months of our initial observation and remained off the welfare caseload for at least two consecutive months. Our samples included those who returned to welfare within the next calendar year as well as those who stayed off.
Demographic Variables
The demographic variables were taken from the CARES database and reflect family characteristics. Some of the variables such as mothers' education, welfare and work history, and the county of residence are as of September 1995 September , 1997 September , and 1999 . Other variables such as the number of children, number of other adults in the household, and the age of the youngest child are updated in each quarter. The analyses were done at the county level. Counties were grouped as follows: Milwaukee County; other urban counties (Brown, Calumet, Chippewa, Dane, Douglas, Eau Claire, Kenosha, La
Crosse, Marathon, Outagamie, Ozaukee, Pierce, Racine, Rock, St. Croix, Sheboygan, Washington, Waukesha, and Winnebago); and rural counties (the other 52 counties in Wisconsin).
Employment and Earnings Variables
Employment and earnings information came from the Wisconsin Unemployment Insurance database. We have information on quarterly earnings from July 1993 through December 2001 for all the mothers in our sample. These data were used to calculate quarterly earnings of each working adults and their eligibility for Medicaid and BadgerCare programs. In addition, this database provides information about employers whether they provide any health insurance.
Geographic Variables
The percentage of female-headed households by ZIP code was taken from the 1990 census zip code-level database STF3B. Unit by Industry and by County," Madison: WI, 1997 WI, , 1998 WI, , 1999 WI, , and 2000 . 1995 (N=46,047 and 7,608) ; the third and fourth columns include those 18 or older in October 1997 (N=18,689 and 7,434) ; the fifth and sixth columns include those 18 or over in October 1999 (=7,363 and 2,997) . M a y -9 9 J u n -9 9 J u l -9 9 A u g -9 9 S e p -9 9 O c t -9 9 N o v -9 9 D e c -9 9 J a n -0 0 
